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Abstract 
This article presents the concept of hegemonic religion and its relationship with 
democracy. This concept entails not only a certain type of institutional relation between 
state and religion, but, more importantly, a kind of national culture with religion at its 
core.  Utilizing Norbert Elias’s figurational sociology, this article analyses how 
postcolonial states have built national habitus that play a decisive role in the politicization 
of religion. It focuses on examples from Islam and Buddhism and discusses how 
hegemonic types of politicized religions have negative impacts on democracy.  
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When evaluating the role of religion in politics, scholarship falls into two opposite 
categories:  it either addresses religion as an independent or a dependent variable. The 
clash of civilizations has been the most discussed theory in which cultures in general, and 
Islam in particular, are the independent variable. Samuel Huntington states that social 
conflicts result from clashes across civilizations and religions. However, as abundantly 
proven by social sciences (Grim and Fink 2011), civilizations are not homogenous, 
monolithic players in world politics with an inclination to “clash.” Instead, civilizations 
consist of constantly evolving pluralistic, divergent, and convergent actors and practices 
(Katzenstein 2010). Thus, the clash of civilizations view fails to address not only conflict 
between civilizations but also conflicts and differences within civilizations. In particular, 
evidence does not substantiate Huntington’s stance that countries with similar cultures 
are coming together, while countries with different cultures are coming apart. In fact, as 
the data presented in this article demonstrate, religious homogeneity increases conflicts 
and the probability of religion’s politicization. Pew data, for example, demonstrates that 
33 percent of countries dominated by one religion experience high levels of religious-
based violence, compared to 20 percent of countries where no religion dominates (Grim 
and Finke 2011: 67). 
Another iteration of the independent variable school bases explanations of social 
or political behaviors on religious traditions. Terrorist and security studies fall in this trap 
when they examine origins of political violence without considering cultural context or 
religious specificities. More specifically, a large body of literature exists on jihad, Al-
Qaeda, and terrorism, which-- with a few exceptions (Pape 2005)--considers religion one, 
if not the primary, cause of terrorist activities worldwide. The same essentialist approach 
characterizes research that focuses on political Islamic movements’ ideological content, 
without systematically linking these movements to specific social and political contexts. 
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This is a tendency of the international relations discipline’s approach to religion--
particularly Islam (Volpi 2010). To a certain extent, the same critique can be made for 
some constructivist work when it is limited to the discursive approach, which views 
cultures as rhetorical practices and narratives (Katzenstein 2010).  
Taking the opposite stand, another body of literature analyzes religion as the 
dependent variable. This literature is dominated by social movement theories, which 
rightly point out that ideology is only one aspect of political mobilization (McAdam and 
Snow 2010; Tarrow 1998). More distinctly, politicization of Islam is attributed to the 
combination of a strong ideology (Wiktorowicz 2006; Shapiro, Smith, and Masoud 2004; 
Jamal 2007) with several “opportunity structures.” The most significant structures are the 
political failure of secular national projects (Kepel 2004; Hafez 2010), the deepening of 
economic crises, and the demographic bulge (Kepel 2004; Zubaida 2009; Lawrence 
1989). This literature is very relevant to understanding the multiple mechanisms of 
politicization, but does not explain why Islamism prevails over other forms of political 
mobilization. 
The same limitation characterizes the rational choice approach that emphasizes 
competition between religious and political actors to explain the role of religion in 
politics, rendering religious ideas, norms, beliefs, and practices dependent on interests. 
While there is some truth to this interest-based approach, it does not address that interests 
also derive from cultural  settings and longue durée processes of socialization; interests 
do not emerge solely and primarily from individual preferences.  
In this regard, we agree with Linklater and Mennell when they remark 
“explanations that reduce power struggles between states to attributes of human nature 
are guilty of the psychological reductionism that explains social relationships in terms of 
libidinal drives ‘without history’” (2010: 401). In other words, the interest-centered 
approach is problematic when it assumes that interests emanate from the individual as a 
discrete unit, operating independently from his or her social environment. More 
generally, most of these approaches operate on the implicit dichotomy of a secularized 
politics under attacks by groups using religion as an oppositional tool at the national and 
international levels.  
We will present an alternative perspective borrowing from historical sociology 
and focusing on complex state-religion interactions such as adaptation, cooperation, and 
competition. This approach offers several advantages. First, it avoids the use of de-
historicized models of political development that project a western-centered approach as 
universal. 
Second, our approach brings the state into the shaping and fashioning of religion. 
Nobert Elias’ figurational sociology is very relevant to our investigation, even though 
Elias did not pay attention to religion per se. Nevertheless, he focuses on transformation 
of institutions in the longue durée and actors’ efforts to control, change, or oppose them; 
this can explain the role of political institutions in the politicization of religions and, more 
specifically, the state’s transformational role. We will show in this article that building 
nation-states in Muslim lands led to concentrations of power in the hands of state rulers, 
which changed social relations but also identified with the Islamic tradition.  More 
specifically, it translated into hegemonic forms of Islam, unknown to pre-modern Muslim 
polities and empires. We will also show that this process characterizes other postcolonial 
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countries, such as Sri Lanka, where the politicization of Buddhism parallels the process 
in Muslim countries. 
Third, our approach offers a different perspective from the historical sociology 
dominating political science. The literature on the history of state-formation is strong, 
with a special focus on structural changes such as shifts in the organization of coercive 
power, alterations in property relations, and changes in modes of production.  
Nonetheless, such works—notably the extensive writings of Charles Tilly (1992), Theda 
Skocpol (1979), and Michael Mann (2012)—seldom refer to Elias’s writings. 
One reason is the perception of Elias’ work as normative because of his 
association between civilization and the West. For this reason we would like to assert that 
civilization in our work does not presuppose the superiority of western cultures, but 
relates to processes of concentration of power and changes in human psyche, behaviors, 
and emotions that happen in any cultural context. In other words, it is disciplinization. 
We are also convinced that this approach to civilization was the one defended by Elias 
himself: 
 
“There is no zero-point of civilizing processes, no point at which human beings are 
uncivilized and as it were begin to be civilized. No human being lacks the capacity for 
self-restraint. No human group could function for any length of time whose adults failed 
to develop, within the wild and at first totally unrestrained little beings, as which humans 
are born, patterns of self-regulation and self-restraint [sic]. What changes in the course of 
a civilizing process are the social patterns of individual self-restraint and the manner in 
which they are built into the individual person in the form of what one now calls 
‘conscience’ or perhaps ‘reason.”’ (1992: 146) 
 
In sum, our intention is to overcome false the dichotomies (individual/society, 
agent/structure, ideational/material, domestic/ international, and so forth) that 
limit our understanding of religion and politics’ interactions. In David Scott’s 
view, then, rather than approaching modern power as a force that blocks 
expression of native agency, it is more helpful to understand modernity as a form 
of power that “altered not merely the balance of forces in the struggle between 
colonizer and colonized, but the terrain itself on which that struggle was engaged; 
that altered not merely the rules of the game of social, political, and cultural life 
among the colonized, but the game as such in which social, political, and cultural 
life was organized” (Scott 2014). Of course, Elias’s approach is not the panacea to 
all research questions in sociology (Layder, 1986,  Goudsblom, 1994).    
 
We consider his approach in order to present politicized religion as a continuously 
evolving configuration of power between state actors, traditional religious 
establishments, state and non-state religious actors, and civil society groups 
(women/intellectuals/religious minorities). In other words, it will highlight the power 
struggles shaping normative expectations about religion, society, and politics among 
different actors. Outside the west, these figurations took diverse forms, beginning during 
colonization and crystallized during nation-building. We call  hegemonic cases in which 
the state not only took control of territory, legitimate use of violence, and redefinition and 
re-alignment of social allegiances, but also restructuration of one religion as part of the 
national identity to the detriment of all other religions. From our previous work (Cesari 
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2014), we have shown that this hegemonic feature characterizes the majority of Muslim 
countries today (except for  Lebanon, Senegal, and Indonesia). It would be misleading, 
however, to conclude that it is correlated to the nature of the Islamic religion. In fact, our 
investigation in the religion and state data base, run by Jonathan Fox 
(http://www.thearda.com/ras/)  shows  that this hegemonic feature appears in other, non-
Muslim countries such as Bhutan, the Dominican Republic, or Sri Lanka (see Appendix 
A). In our argument below, we will compare Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, and Sri Lanka.  
We deliberately selected Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey for the purpose of this article 
to shed light on the postcolonial state’s role in redefining Islam, even in countries 
considered “secular” by western standards.  Similarly, Buddhism’s hegemonic status in 
Sri Lanka is not explained by the Buddhist tradition, but instead by the ways the 
postcolonial state redefined Buddhism as a national feature. We will show how this 
hegemonic configuration correlates with existing indexes of political and social violence 
across different countries, hence providing general validity to our approach. 
 
Politicized Religion as a social action field or figuration 
 The starting point of our analysis is the gradual processes of change either generates 
novel institutional reforms over long periods of time or produces unexpected breakdowns 
at critical thresholds. We also analyze how shared worldviews, cognitive scripts, and 
normative templates may interact with discursive practices to influence institutions and 
institutional actors. In other words, by investigating religious institutions as part of 
nation-building, this research shows that culture and history influence not only discourses 
but also material interests and organizations.  
We will begin by synthesizing the socio-genesis of state institutions in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. 
 
Socio-genesis of state institutions and power 
At the core of Islam’s politicization lie structural changes unleashed by the transition 
from pre-modern political entity to modern nation-state. This transition led to the rise of 
authoritarian “promethean” regimes where state actors imposed upon their societies 
invasive social and cultural transformations. This resulted in the construction of strong 
monist national ideologies with Islam at their center. 
The nation-building process in Muslim countries brought a decisive re-
organization of the society-state-religion nexus unknown in the pre-modern era. Under 
the Caliphate, Islamic institutions and clerics were not subordinated to political power. 
Most scholars of political history (Enayat 2005, Lapidus 2002) argue that divisions of 
labor and hierarchies of power between temporal and spiritual authorities were fairly well 
established by the tenth century. In the medieval period, there were certainly “official” 
Ulama working on behalf of political rulers and providing religious justification for their 
policies, similar to the modern period. However, the major difference is that religious 
authorities and institutions were financially and organizationally independent from the 
political power.  
The Caliphs also acknowledged society’s cultural and religious diversity, 
although this did not yield egalitarian legal and political statuses for all. The Ummah was 
defined as the sum of the territories and populations under Caliphate rule, encompassing 
an extensive distribution of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups, including Muslims, 
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Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Bahai, and Druze. Although the Caliphate theoretically 
represented the original community that followed the message of the Prophet 
Mohammad, in reality its power was limited by geography and comparable to that of any 
secular dynasty ruling multiple ethnic and religious groups (Hourani 1988: 12). This 
tension between the ideal (a community following the Prophet’s model) and the political 
reality was apparent in the distinction between Shari’a and Syar forged by the juris 
consultes. Shari’a referred to laws applying to Muslims, while Syar designed laws 
applying to non-Muslims living under Caliphate rule, or relations between the Caliphate 
and non-Muslims at the international level. In contrast, the modern vision of the Ummah 
differs from this imperial definition; the consensus among contemporary Muslim scholars 
is that the Ummah refers to a spiritual, non-territorial community distinguished by its 
members’ shared beliefs. The Ummah is therefore often considered a type of Muslim 
citizenship, independent of territory (Hassan 2002: 94). Contemporary theologian Yusuf 
al Qaradawi, in the context of the Palestinian national movement, illustrates this vision of 
the Ummah as a transnational alliance of Muslims that excludes non-Muslims: 
"Supporting the Palestinian people in Gaza is a religious duty on every Muslim individual 
[from Morocco to Indonesia] according to his capabilities, and no one is exempted from 
that duty”  (Hassan 2002: 94). 
As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the state’s emergence as the central political 
institution coincided with the homogenization of different national communities. Nation-
building systematically omitted ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in order to create 
one nation defined by one religion and one language. This homogenization also led to a 
politicized narrative of religion: political Islam. In this regard, Muslim countries are not 
exceptional; the advent of the modern nation-state redefined rules of engagement 
between religion and politics everywhere. The architects of new, non-Western nation-
states had to determine to what degree countries’ “core” collective identities should be 
sacrificed for western institutions and technologies necessary to strengthen the state 
militarily and economically.i These changes stemmed from several events. 
The first event occurred prior to state formation, during the Ottoman Empire’s 
reign and the rise of western imperialism, symbolized by the Ottoman Empire’s inclusion 
in the Westphalian order under the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The treaty ended the Crimean 
War and was the first time the Ottoman Empire participated as “state” in the Westphalian 
order. In the aftermath of this symbolic inclusion, three disparate factors contributed to 
the Middle East’s adoption of the Westphalian State system in the first half of the 
twentieth century: the fall of imperial governments in the region; the rise of local 
nationalist movements in urban centers such as Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, and Damascus; 
and the emergence of states with demarcated territorial boundaries that pursued self-
interests and experienced hostile territorial disputes with neighboring states. Pro-western, 
liberal “civilizationalism” also became the dominant paradigm of the Ottoman modernists 
and reformists, despite strong internal resistance against Western imperialism. This 
opposition stemmed from the population’s objection to the western critique that the 
Caliphate was not “civilized” enough to gain the loyalty of its Christian subjects, which 
subsequently led to two different movements: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism (Aydin 
2007:32). 
Pan-Islamism was an intellectual and political movement that considered the 
universal Islamic community (Ummah) the ideal basis for modern political unity, as 
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modeled by the life and works of the Prophet Mohammed and his first four successors 
served. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, a western threat became more acute 
with European incursions into Egypt and Tunisia in 1798 and 1881, respectively. These 
imperialist exploits greatly impacted 19th century reformers, such as Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciple, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), who urged all 
Muslims to unite under al-Wahda al-Islamiyya (Muslim Unity) in the face of western 
imperialism in their journal al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond), (Aydin 2007: 61). 
The Ottoman Caliphate’s popularity also increased: the Caliph was recognized as the 
head of the Muslim State, on diplomatic par with the western powers (Aydin 2007: 33). 
Accordingly, Pan-Islamic ideology refashioned the concept of the Caliph, emphasizing 
his status as the Prophet Muhammad’s vice-regent, in order to buttress the Empire’s 
legitimacy in the international state system.ii  
  
Pan-Arabism emerged at the same time as Pan-Islamism, reached its height in the 
1960s, and held that all Arab peoples, as a linguistic and cultural community, should 
unite under one banner. Its origins were in the al-Nahda cultural renaissance of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries with the revival of Arabic poetry and literature and the rise of 
the print media (Khalidi 1991).  
The Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab movements helped shape resistance to foreign 
domination in Muslim-majority countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Hence, resistance campaigns against the west depicted European modernization, along 
with its nation-building and secularization components, through the lens of Islamic 
terminology, and in opposition with  Arab, Middle Eastern identity. For this reason, no 
national rulers, even the most secular, could ignore or eradicate Islamic references and 
norms. 
For example, in Egypt, the political implementation of the salafiyya was 
embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood, which rose as the major competitor to the secular 
nationalist groups. At the same time, the secular state nationalized and reshaped the 
traditional religious establishment, hence positing itself as a major actor in promoting 
legitimate Islam. Consequently, the Brotherhood’s political actions became increasingly 
confined to national boundaries. 
 Turkey offers a different case of norm diffusion because its nation-building 
project was the direct outcome of tensions and conflicts around Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Arabism within the Ottoman Empire. The last Ottoman Sultans, such as Abdulhamid II 
(1876-1909), used Pan-Islamic ideas to promote imperial unity and maintain control over 
parts of the Empire penetrated by western political ideas (Karpat 2001: 125). As Kemal 
Karpat suggests, “religious” activities were used to “nationalize” the milletsiii of the 
Ottoman dynasty (Karpat 2001: 229). In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Young Turk movement (beginning in 1908) emerged as an alternative political project to 
reinforce the Caliphate. Young Turk Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) was known for his 
attempts to reconcile Islam with western ideas. Riza’s project was an “anti-clerical 
struggle to refashion Islam as a private matter and as a rational belief comparable with 
modernization” (Umat 2010: 5-6). In other words, the Young Turk movement was not 
necessarily anti-Islam but fought against the Caliphate’s version of the religion-state 
relationship. Confronted with independence movements (Armenian, Greek, etc.) 
sprouting throughout the Empire, the Young Turks emphasized their own “Turkishness,” 
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spread the idea of a Turkish nation, and promoted a local form of Islam where prayers 
and sermons were performed in the Turkish language (Karpat 2001: 305).  With the 
Ottoman Empire’s collapse at the end of World War I, the nationalist movement 
ascended in the former provinces of the empire and led to the creation of modern Turkey. 
As a result, Ataturk was keen to delegitimize Islamic references in social and public life 
but, at the same time, he took control of the dominant Sunni school, nationalized its 
endowments and clerics, and crafted an unprecedented Turkish Islam. 
In Tunisia, people demonstrated allegiance to the Ummah via pervasive loyalty to 
the Caliphate, in order to resist reforms initiated by the French-influenced modernist elite, 
such as Mohammad as-Sadiq Bey (1859-1881). From 1864 to 1881, after France became 
the official protector of the country with the Treaty of Bardo, Pan-Islamist ideals induced 
continuous unrest against the urban, Westernized elites asserting their supremacy.iv 
Subsequently, in the wake of the First World War, the sense of trans-continental Islamic 
belonging, stemming from solidarity with the Ottomans, persisted with the 1029 
formation of the Destour Party. The party’s membership drew from the educated elite, 
fluent in Islamic and Arabic cultures (in contrast to the western-oriented elite). 
Interestingly, Destour was the predecessor to the Neo-Destour Party that arose in 1934 
and spearheaded the nationalist movement under Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987). As a 
consequence, many of the Islamic connections to nationalism were minimized and thus 
began to fade, although Bourguiba relied on Islamic institutions and symbols to mobilize 
the masses in anticolonial jihad.  For instance, his party held meetings in mosques and 
zawiyas (Sufi meeting places), and urged the public to pray five times a day for national 
martyrs (Boulby 1998: 592).This treatment of Islam contrasts starkly with his policy after 
Tunisian independence in 1956: the Personal Status Law of 1957 abolished Shari’a 
courts, banned the hijab, and restricted polygamy. This brought into focus Tunisia’s 
French influences and secular-nationalist identity over its Arab-Islamic identity. In other 
words, during the fight for Tunisian independence, Islam was part of the rhetoric against 
colonial powers, but, after independence, Islam was typically painted as a symbol of the 
past; westernization was deemed representative of the newly formed country’s future.  
Similar to Turkey, Bourguiba created a new Tunisian form of Islam by absorbing 
religious institutions into state institutions and eradicating Islam’s social and cultural 
influence. 
 
In summary, to gain popular legitimacy, and to counter pan-Islamist threats, the architects 
of nascent, post-colonial States co-opted Islamic educational and charitable institutions 
and clerical authorities. This occurred through nationalization of endowments, creation of 
ministries of religious affairs, and concessions to the nations’ “Islamic” characters by 
including Islam in the constitution as a key source of the state’s legal and social roles. Al-
Azhar, the world’s pre-eminent Sunni theological religious institution, was co-opted by 
the state to bolster its legitimacy, by reducing the sheikh’s authority and bringing 
religious schools and mosques under state control. Other authoritarian regimes exercised 
similar measures to control religious institutions and suppress Islamic authorities that 
might compete with the state (e.g. Sufi brotherhoods in Turkey). The inclusion of Islam 
within state institutions has nationalized Islamic discourses, authorities, and teachings, 
thus giving rise to a hegemonic version of Islam. While most legal codes were based on 
European models, the primacy of Shari’a in the sphere of family law was retained, and 
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dominant forms of Islam were given legal privilege, which affected the status of 
minorities. For example, adherents of religions not recognized as distinct Islamic sects, 
such as the Baha’i in Egypt and the Alevi in Turkey, are either amalgamated to the 
Muslim majority or rejected as heretics. Thus, whether Islam is defined as the state 
religion (Egypt) or not (Turkey), Islamic institutions became part of the state system and 
national identity. 
In the same way, local reactions to colonization helped reshape Buddhism in Sri 
Lanka. In the 18th and 19th century, a ‘westernized’ and ‘modernized’ form of Buddhism 
under British colonial influence became a distinctive feature of the emergent acculturated 
intellectual class. From the end of the nineteenth century, Buddhist revival movements 
allied with political movements seeking independence and indigenisation of culture, in 
ways similar to pan-Islamism. All leaders declared their aim to revive traditional 
Buddhist values and simultaneously harness modern achievements to improve the 
population’s living conditions, or to strengthen their own leading position in society (See 
McMahan 2008: 43-58; Williams 2005; Lopez 1995).  
After independence in 1948, the main Buddhist organization, or sangha, 
demanded action to protect Buddhism and attempted to institutionalize the traditional 
connection between Buddhism and state. The Betrayal of Buddhism report, published in 
1956 by the Buddhist commission from the congress, provided the narrative and 
historical justification for granting Buddhism the central role in Sri Lanka’s nation-
building process. “In this report, the monks demanded the abolition of Article 29 
(protection of minorities), the nationalization of Christian schools, the dismissal of 
Roman Catholic nurses and the introduction of the Buddhist public holiday of Poya” 
(Weiberg-Salzmann 2014: 291). This “buddhification” of Sri-Lanka received wide 
political support. The two monastic schools, Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara, obtained 
university status.  In the 1956 parliamentary election campaign, monks mobilized to 
spread their ideas:  they identified Tamils as a threat to national identity, legitimizing 
anti-Tamil violence. 
As the state and nation were increasingly defined by Buddhist, Sinhalese identity, 
Tamils encountered more barriers to higher education and were barred from positions in 
state administration. The 1972 and 1978 constitutional reforms explicitly prioritized 
Buddhism in the Constitution (articles 9, 10, and 14).  
 
“The government created a ministry for ‘cultural affairs’ (i.e., the promotion of the 
Sinhala- Buddhist heritage), restored Buddhist shrines and commissioned a new 
translation of the Buddhist canon. It was of symbolic significance that the parliament 
moved to the earlier Sinhalese centre of power in Kotte (today: Sri Jayawardenepura). 
The political system was to guide the establishment of a righteous society inspired by 
Buddhist ideals of justice.” (292) 
 
More generally, when Buddhism became hegemonic, it was given the “foremost 
place,” with the state committed to protect it, often to the detriment of other religious 
groups (“Sri Lanka” 2013). For example, in early 2013, the Ministry of Religion issued a 
non-binding circular requiring the registration of Christian churches before construction. 
Officials often use this circular to close existing churches and block construction of new 
ones, regardless of the circular’s illegality. Concerning education, despite Muslim, 
Hindu, and Christian students’ right to religious education, some schools have reportedly 
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forced students to study Buddhism if they could not be taught in their own religion. 
Additional reports include officials blocking school-entry to Christians and throwing out 
Muslim girls who wore headscarves. During examinations, despite laws against this 
practice, non-Buddhist students were reportedly quizzed on Buddhist topics and 
penalized for failure through fines or expulsion (“Sri Lanka” 2015: 201-204).  
Concerning family law, while issues concerning family law are governed by the 
individual ethnic or religious group, marriages must be approved by the Ministry of 
Buddha Sasana. (“Sri Lanka” 2013)  
It is important to note the difference between a dominant religion, an established 
religion, and a hegemonic religion. A religion is dominant when it is the religion of the 
majority of a given country. In such cases, the dominant religion continues to impart 
historical and cultural references that are considered to be “natural” and “legitimate.” 
Religious symbols and rituals become embedded in the public culture and the country. 
Examples of such dominant religions include Protestantism in the United States or 
Catholicism in France and Poland.  An established religion is a church recognized by law 
as the religion of the country or state, sometimes financially supported by the state like in 
Denmark. Usually, the existence of an established church is not incompatible with the 
recognition of religious minorities. A religion becomes hegemonic, however, when the 
state grants a certain religious group exclusive legal or political rights denied to other 
religions. It cannot be compared to civil religion, where the dominant religion’s public 
features are sufficiently secularized to accommodate all other religious groups.  
Hegemonic religion, by contrast, is the imposition of the nationalized religion on all 
citizens independent of their religious affiliation, simultaneously leading to the denial of 
public expression of all religious groups, except the nationalized religious group. 
The field of politicized religion is defined by the competition amongst state, 
Islamist, Buddhist, and civil groups to define what is to be a good citizen and a Muslim 
or a Buddhist.v  
 
The modern religious habitus: Conflation of national and religious belonging 
One of the consequences of the rise of a hegemonic religion is the moralization of the 
concept of public order as Islamic or Buddhist principles/institutions/actors provide 
legitimacy to state actions. Included in that process are often-unarticulated 
understandings about what religion in the abstract is or should be. Hence, the state is 
always drawing a line between religious and secular, and reserving its sole authority to do 
so. Hussein Agrama describes secularism in most Muslim countries as primarily a state 
action or what he calls “active secularism” (Agrama 2010: 495-523). One way to think 
about the principle of “active secularism” is to see the state as promoting an abstract 
notion of “religion,” defining the spaces it should inhabit, and then working to discipline 
actual religious traditions to conform to this abstract notion and fit into these spaces.  
The state’s action created a new religious habitus linking religious belonging to 
national belonging and citizenship status, erecting the Ummah as a homogenous 
community of Muslims, and making the state the implementing agent of religious rules. 
The socialization post-independence built a habitus linking religious belonging and 
national belonging. Structures of habitus are acquired by specific social positions that are 
durable, generative, and transposable. 
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Muslim habitus in modern Muslim-majority countries is built on beliefs that Islam 
is one and important to citizenry and nationhood. With the creation of the state education 
system, curricula and textbooks socialized new generations to the idea that national 
identity and Islamic identity are two sides of the same coin. By inscribing Islam within 
the public education system, the state positions itself as the protector of Islamic heritage, 
assuming “the responsibility to provide children and youths with trustworthy religious 
guidance.” vi 
National unity comes from two sources. The first is the cultivation of national 
brotherhood (internal cohesion) against outsiders, including external and internal threats 
and enemies, regardless of sectarian divisions. Given that nationalism concerns 
difference, “the imagined community cannot be all-inclusive” (Durrani and Dunne 2010: 
218). Consequently, the second source of national unity is exclusivist nationalist 
discourses, which have implications for citizenship, access to political power, and 
allocation of resources (230). Thus, the state excludes those who do not belong to the 
dominant group within its discursive project of establishing ideological hegemony and 
constructing national identity through education.  
However, the underlying and more pervasive source of exclusion is the use of 
Islam within the education system to homogenize the nation. Despite more recent 
initiatives to focus on tolerance in school curricula, public education curricula still 
neglect and discriminate against religious minorities. Also, because the concept of 
tolerance is only promoted in the religious context, other parts of the curricula 
(history/social studies) that are also influenced by Islamic terms such as jihad remain 
within a militant context and continue to instill ideas of Islamic supremacy and uniting 
against “infidels.” 
Similarly, Sri Lankan textbooks exhibit cases of Buddhist favoritism and 
disregarding others. In the grade 10 History book, the “myth of descent” is referenced 
through a pro-Buddhist lens. The “myth of descent” is a fiercely debated topic between 
Buddhist Sinhalese, the majority, and Tamils, a minority, concerning which group 
originally occupied the island. The textbook points to the inseparable link between 
Buddhism and Sri Lanka through the original inhabitants, who, it claims, were also 
descendants of the Sinhalese (Gaul 2014). Examples from this chapter clarifying this 
matter include the statement that “the history of Sri Lanka begins after the arrival of 
Prince Vijaya with 700 followers. They were the first Aryans [synonymous with 
Sinhalese] to come to Sri Lanka” (ibid.). This statement is reiterated later when the 
textbook claims that not only were the Sinhalese the first to inhabit the island, but that the 
Tamils settled the island through foreign conquest: “…14 to15-year-old students, whom 
this text targets, would feel a sense of pride if they were Sinhalese, or a resounding sense 
of alienation and defeat if they were Tamil. 
 Additionally, Sinhalese and Tamils’ education is physically and linguistically 
separated, exacerbating negative stereotypes of each community. In 2008, barely 5% of 
all Sri Lankan schools offered education in mixed mediums (Aturupane 2011). Attempts 
at addressing the above issues include the National Education Reform bill (1997), the 
National Curriculum Policy and Process bill (2000), a new curriculum adopted in 2007 
(which the above references are from), and the National Policy and a Comprehensive 
Framework of Actions of Education for Social Cohesion and Peace (2008). 
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 In civil society, Buddhism also takes a leading role. Textbooks draw a connection 
between society and Buddhism, stating: “Try to do something great every day with love 
and respect for your religion and the country. Give up greed for false vision. Always try 
to uphold the Sinhalese nation and Buddhism” (Aturupane 2011). In Grade 7 history, a 
Sinhala poem is used to promote Sri Lankan nationalism: “As long as I remember the 
brave Sinhala nation; As long as I have my great royal blood; I’ll never shed tears; So, 
goodbye my honoured Mother Lanka.” These examples, among many, create a virtually 
inseparable tie between Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan nation, at the exclusion of other 
groups. 
Moreover, it is important to note that religious references are incorporated 
throughout the entire public school curriculum. They permeate history, social studies, 
civics textbooks, and even appear in mathematics. vii  Such a “functionalization of 
religion,” as Gregory Starrett terms it, illustrates the socialization process at work, where 
the state exerts social control and assumes moral authority by promoting a “proper 
Islamic identity,” and by extension, cultivating “good social behavior” (âdâb ijtimâ’îya) 
of “good” citizens (1998: 10).  Religion is part of the national belonging/identity even if 
you do not belong to this specific religion. It is understood as a tool of resistance against 
western imperialism and element of good citizenship. Based on this common 
understanding of religion, different agents and institutions compete to define right versus 
wrong, acceptable versus unacceptable, in matters of political and religious behaviors. 
These actors are traditional clerical establishment, political parties, NGOs, state rulers, 
but also transnational religious and political movements.  This field of actors frames 
claims for an Islamic state or a Buddhist nation. Thus, more than a religiously based legal 
order, politicized religion is part of national political culture.  
 
The bloody borders of hegemonic religion 
In his book, The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington has a chapter called “the bloody 
borders of Islam,” where he attributes the level of conflicts in Muslim countries to Islam. 
Most existing indexes of political violence reinforce this essentialized approach to 
religion, with the majority of Muslim countries scoring high. Are these rankings due to 
Islam or, instead, a particular type of state-religion relationship? To respond to this 
question, we examined indexes of political violence and social hostility to determine if 
they correlate with the hegemonic status of religion.  If we take into account three 
defining traits of hegemonic religion, (nationalization of religious institutions, education, 
and law), we find that the hegemonic nature of the religion correlates with political 
violence.  Countries with hegemonic religion are also characterized by high social 
hostility, as seen below.viii 
 
Figure 1. PEW Social Religious Hostility – January 2014 
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Iraq Very High 
!
Bangladesh Very High 
!
Palestine Very High 
Pakistan Very High 
!
Nigeria Very High 
!
Guinea High 
Somalia Very High 
!
Yemen Very High 
!
Comoros Moderate 
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!
Bahrain High 
!
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!
Jordan High 
!
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Sri Lanka Very High 
!
Kuwait High 
!
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!
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!
Burkina Faso Moderate 
Azerbaijan High 
!
Libya High 
!
Mauritania Moderate 
Iran High 
!
Tunisia High 
!
Niger Moderate 
Malaysia High 
!
Turkey High 
!
Senegal Moderate 
Maldives High 
!
Chad Moderate 
!
Sierra Leone Moderate 
Saudi Arabia High 
!
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Figure 2. Political Violence - 2014 (Methodology in Appendix B) 
 
 
Country 
Violent 
Crisis 
Limited 
War War 
Afghanistan 0 0 1 
Egypt 2 1 0 
Indonesia 1 0 0 
Iraq 1 0 1 
Pakistan 6 1 1 
Somalia 6 0 1 
Sudan 2 0 3 
Syria 3 0 3 
Algeria 3 1 0 
Azerbaijan 1 0 0 
Iran 2 0 0 
Malaysia 1 0 0 
Maldives 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 1 0 0 
Brunei 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 
Morocco 1 0 0 
Tajikistan 1 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 4 0 0 
Nigeria 3 0 2 
Yemen 3 2 2 
Bahrain 1 0 0 
Jordan 1 0 0 
Kuwait 2 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan 2 0 0 
Libya 1 0 1 
Tunisia 2 0 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 
Chad 1 1 0 
UAE 0 0 0 
Oman 0 0 0 
Qatar 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 
Western Sahara 1 0 0 
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Lebanon 3 1 0 
Palestine 1 0 1 
Guinea 0 0 0 
Comoros 0 0 0 
Djibouti 1 0 0 
Kosovo 0 0 0 
Mali 2 1 0 
Burkina Faso 1 0 0 
Mauritania 0 0 0 
Niger 2 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 
Albania 0 0 0 
The Gambia 0 0 0 
In these conditions, the investigation of the national habitus is a promising way to 
identify ways that religion impacts democracy and politics in general. The point of the 
exercise above is to show that the existing statistics on political violence should not be 
explained by the essence of Islam or religion in general,  but by the specific culture and 
habitus  of each country. In other words, referring to grounded, historical approaches 
about religion and democracy  would lead to different conclusions on existing data.At the 
same time, it raises the question of a  broader approach to secularization. 
 
Conclusion 
Norbert Elias’ approach allows us to overcome the “fixism” of most investigations that 
bypass historical development to privilege decontextualized, variable-centered 
investigation. It also avoids the teleological approach of irreversible processes of 
modernization or democratization, converging with recent anthropological work 
highlighting, for example, how democratization and de-democratization can operate 
simultaneously.     
Historical approaches also prove relevant to break the religious/secular divide and 
to contextualize it.  The assessment of the theory of secularization is now a staple of the 
literature on religion and politics and entails objections to one or some of the core three 
dimensions: separation, privatization and decline of personal religiosity. Most the 
critique, as noted by Jonathan Fox in his article for this issue, is aimed at the claim that 
religion is losing its significance in the modern era. Alternative approaches of 
secularization focus on social differentiation (Wilson 1992; Casanova 2004), which 
insists on the increased autonomy of social segments (economics, sciences, education, 
etc.) previously under the influence of religious doctrines or organizations.  Similarly, 
some talk about religion’s loss of relevance at the level of social institutions, but that the 
theory cannot address the loss of individuals’ beliefs (Chaves 1994: 749-774). Reduction 
of secularization to social institutions and churches has been criticized (Stark 1999: 249-
273; Luckmann 1967) and even proven wrong (Fox 2015). Others reject the idea of an 
irreversible process of privatization of religious actors and institutions (Casanova 2004). 
Another thread focuses on religious pluralism and egalitarian individualism. (Bruce 
2003). At the end, we are left with some confusion: all of these critiques are highly 
significant, but they do not come together to create a solid alternative paradigm (Hurd 
2007).  The main reason for the weakness of these disparate efforts is that they do not 
address the same level of secularization: institutional (separation), social (privatization), 
or individual (decline of religiosity). They also rely on the assumed separation between 
religious and secular, while historical genealogies (Asad 2003) demonstrate the 
continuous plasticity of what religious and secular mean. In this regard, a genealogical 
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study of political and religious habitus would bypass the conundrum of the current debate 
on secularization by observing, instead, the continuous redistribution of influence and 
power between political and religious actors and institutions. More specifically, what is at 
stake as shown though the examples of Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Egypt, is a continuous 
differentiation, where states’ delineate domains of actions outside religious actors and 
norms (foreign policy, economic policy, civil and penal law) and assign a specific status 
and role to religion (in civil law, national identity). Differentiation is a never ending 
process; religious actors attempt to claim new domains of influence (criminal law), while 
more secular actors try to either preserve some domains from religious claims (women 
rights advancement) or acquire new ones (sexual rights, freedom of speech). 
Consequently, what is at stake in this ongoing differentiation/de-differentiation is the 
continuous struggle between actors to define the boundaries of the secular and the 
religious. These boundaries reflect the specific history of the state-society relations in a 
given country. For example, secular actors in the countries discuss above, do not contest 
the religious nature of civil law and, when they want to reform it, they operate within the 
existing framework  influenced by religious norms. Similarly, most religiously-inspired 
claims of political actors in these countries do not contest the secular nature of foreign 
policy or economy, but focus on civil law and penal law. 
Thus, the question becomes: what level of differentiation between religion and 
politics is compatible with democracy? To be clear, state-religion interactions do not 
directly influence the move from authoritarian to democratization, but they do influence 
the level of democracy in the domain of civil liberties, individual rights, and minority 
group rights. In other words, if we distinguish the democracy-based domains of elections, 
separation of power, rule of law, and civil liberties, the influence of state-religion is most 
influential concerning civil liberties. Most importantly, the hegemonic status of a religion 
institutionalizes religious divides and, hence, increases the probability of social hostility 
between ethnic and religious groups. The highest levels political violence and social 
hostility are connected with hegemon and authoritarian control of religions. A worthy 
investigation, outside the scope of this article, would be establishing a typology of the 
main differentiation processes at work and evaluating their influence on the political 
development of each country. 
 
Appendix(A:(Countries(with(Hegemonic(Traits(
Source:(Religion(and(State(Database,(Jonathan(Fox,(Bar(Ilan(University(!
Country Education Finance Laws Country Education Finance Laws 
One Trait    India   X 
Angola   X Indonesia   X 
Armenia X   Italy X   
Bahamas X   Jamaica   X 
Barbados   X Kenya   X 
Bolivia X   Lebanon   X 
Botswana   X Lesotho   X 
Brazil   X Liberia   X 
Bulgaria  X  Malawi   X 
Burkina Faso  X Maldives   X 
Burundi   X Mauritius   X 
Tara Siegel  1/22/2016 2:35 AM
Comment [1]: I don’t follow this sentence. 
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Cameroon   X Mozambique   X 
Chile  X  Namibia   X 
Colombia   X Nigeria   X 
Cyprus, Greek  X Norway X   
Denmark X   Panama X   
Eritrea   X Papua New Guinea  X 
Ethiopia   X Paraguay   X 
Fiji   X Peru   X 
Gambia   X Philippines   X 
Germany   X Portugal   X 
Ghana   X Senegal   X 
Guinea   X Sierra Leone   X 
Guinea Bissau  X Singapore   X 
Haiti   X Solomon Islands  X 
Honduras  X  Spain   X 
Iceland  X  Sri Lanka   X !!
Country Education Finance Laws Country Education Finance Laws 
Tanzania   X Swaziland X  X 
Togo   X Syria  X X 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
  X Turkey X X  
Turkmenistan X      
Uganda   X Three Traits   
UK   X Afghanistan           X X X 
Uzbekistan  X  Algeria X X X 
Venezuela  X  Bahrain X X X 
Western Sahara  X Bhutan X X X 
Yugoslavia-Serbia X  Brunei X X X 
Zambia   X Comoros X X X 
Zimbabwe   X Dominican 
Republic 
X X X 
    Egypt X X X 
Two Traits    Iran X X X 
Bangladesh  X X Iraq X X X 
Belize X  X Jordan X X X 
Burma X  X Kuwait X X X 
Cambodia X X  Libya X X X 
Costa Rica X  X Malaysia X X X 
Djibouti  X X Mauritania X X X 
Georgia X X  Oman X X X 
Greece  X X Qatar X X X 
Israel  X X Saudi Arabia          X X X 
Malta  X X Sudan X X X 
Morocco  X X Tunisia X X X 
Pakistan  X X UAE X X X 
Somalia X X  Yemen X X X 
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Appendix B 
Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch - Conflict Barometer 2014 – Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research 
- The intensity levels (1 through 5) according to the conflict barometer are:  
1. Dispute: Non-violent, low-intensity 
2. Non-violent crisis: Non-violent, low intensity 
3. Violent Crisis: Violent, Medium Intensity 
4. Limited War: Violent, High Intensity 
5. War: Violent, High Intensity 
- Intensity is categorized through a combination of “conflict measures” in a specific 
conflict in a geographical area in a given space of time 
o Conflict Measures 
! Actions and communications carried out by actors that lie outside 
established norms of conflict regulation 
! Conflict regulation is defined as a “mechanism of conflict 
management that is accepted by the conflict actors,” e.g. elections or 
courts 
- Assessing the Intensities of Violent Conflicts 
o When measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used 
indicating the conflict means and consequences. The dimension of means 
encompasses the use of weapons and personnel, the dimension of 
consequences the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees/internally 
displaced persons. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i The adjective “core” refers to an essentialized vision of culture and identity, which often 
drove political reforms (Duara 1995: 239-275). 
ii Additionally, it is important to note that even after World War I, Pan-Islamism did not promote 
indiscriminate hatred or rejection of the west. The reformulation of pan-Islamism as a categorically anti-
western ideology happened after World War II, forming the basis for anti-modernist and reactionary 
positions of future Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda. 
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iii Millets were religious communities regulated by their own civil rules. They were the 
cornerstone of the Ottoman political system.  
iv Signed on May 12, 1881 between France and Mohammad as-Sadiq Bey, rendering 
Tunisia a French protectorate.  
v It is also influenced by international and transnational forces (Salafis/Muslim states/international 
organizations), which is outside the per view of this article. 
vi “Groups claiming independent authority to interpret Islamic scriptures and transmit 
Islamic culture undermine one of the basic foundations of the state’s moral legitimacy: its 
protection of the Islamic heritage, including the responsibility to provide children and 
youths with trustworthy religious guidance.” (Starrett!1998:!5). 
vii Pittman and Chishtie examine how Islam penetrated the mathematics curriculum in 
Pakistan. For example, a typical mathematics exercise addresses inheritance and 
distribution of an estate. In these problems, the widow is given an eighth of the estate and 
the sons and daughters receive the remainder, with the sons receiving twice the shares as 
the daughters (Daun and Walford 2004: 113). 
viii Social Religious Hostility Methodology: Hostility level based on 13 primary 
questions, scored between  0 and 1. Each country’s results were divided by 1.3, yielding a 
total score on a 1-10 scale. Each country was given a level with “Low” being from 0-1.4, 
“Moderate” from 1.5-3.5, “High” from 3.6-7.1, and “Very High” from 7.2 and higher. 
Questions are available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/RestrictionsV-SHI.pdf 
Political Religious Hostility Methodology: Hostility level based on 20 primary 
questions, scored between 0 and 1. Each country’s results were divided by 2, yielding a 
total score on a 1-10 scale. Each country was given a level with “Low” being from 0-2.3, 
“Moderate” from 2.4-4.4, “High” from 4.5-6.5, and “Very High” from 6.6 and higher. 
Questions are available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/RestrictionsV-
GRI.pdf 
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